The evidence presented in this paper indicates that changes in government spending, transfers and taxes can have substantial effects on aggregate demand. The estimates also indicate that the promise of future social security benefits significantly reduces private saving. Each of the basic implications of the so-called "Ricardian equivalence theorem" is contradicted by the data. The results are consistent with the more general view of the effects of fiscal actions and fiscal expectations that is described in the paper. been and can continue to be at least as important. The present paper nevertheless ignores these fiscal incentives in order to focus on the direct demand effects of the "nondistortionary" aspects of changes in government expenditure, transfers and taxes. More specifically, the paper examines whether the power of such, policies is reduced or eliminated by the way in which consumers react to the policies themselves or to the resulting change in government debt.
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The early Keynesian analysis was based on the extreme assumption that fiscal policies affect consumption only through thir impact on current disposable income. This view implied powerful and predictable effects of tax reductions, transfers and deficitfinanced government spending. Over the years, this view has been modified in two important ways, First, the profession now rognizes that the extent of this fiscal stimulus is limited by the * Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic
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(2Ol79) monetary feedbacks through higher interest rates, reduced real money balances and changes in portfolio composition. Second, we have learned from Friedman (1957) , Modigliani (1954) and others that it is important to distinguish between transitory and permanent changes in income and therefore that consumers' response to a change in taxes or transfers depends on how long that change is expected to persist. Although there is disagreement about the quantitative implications of these two points, the general qualitative conclusions are now universally accepted.
More recently, several economists have revived a very old argument about the equivalence of debt and taxes that implies that government deficits have no effect on aggregate demand.1 More specifically, the "pre-Ricardian equivalence hypothesis asserts that consumers respond in exactly the same way to a change in taxes and a change in the government deficit. A tax cut that leads to a change in the government deficit therefore has no effect on consumer demand. This "ex ante crowding out" makes the more general crowding out through interest rates, real balances and portfolio effects irrelevant. A similar line of reasoning leads to the conclusions that transfer payments financed by deficits have no effect on 1The revival of this idea is due to Bailey (1971) , Baro (1974) , Kochin (1974), il1er and Upton (1974) , and Tanner (1979a,b) .
2i think the label "pre-Ricardian" £s preferable to "Ricardian" because Ricardo himself made a point of rejecting this equivalence argument which .had been suqqested by others. As O'Driscoll (1977) has pointed out, Ricardo (1951,, 4:187) wrote "This argument or charging posterity with the intërest on Our debt, or of re1ieving thernfrorn a portion of such interest, is often used by otherwise well informed people, but I confess I see no weight in it." (My emphasis.) I shall refer to it as a "hypothesis" or "Proposition" rather than a "theorem" to avoid the implication that it is provable and true. demand and that the promise of future social security retirement benefits does not increase current consumption. Barro (1979) summarizes these implications of fiscal impotence in the concluding paragraph of a recent paper; "It seems fair to say that neither economic theories nor empirical analyses provide convincing supporting evidence for the effectiveness of fiscal policy. The area of fiscal policy exhibits a wide gap between, on the one hand, the weight of theory and evidence, and, on the other hand, the general opinion of professional economists and policymakers." (p. 21).
My reading of the evidence and analysis of the theoretical issues leads to quite different conclusions. .1 believe that the pre-Ricardian view greatly exagggerates the publi&s perception of and response to the future tax obligations implied by existing government debt. The assertion of fiscal impotence is therefore quite unwarranted. On the contrary, a more general theory implies and the evidence indicates that consumers do not regard taxes and transfers as equivalent to changes in debt and that they do regard both government debt and future social security benefits as net wealth. Specific estimates in support of these conclusions are presented in the present paper.
Moreover, even if the pre-Ricardian equivalence proposition were true, changes in government deficits that result from changes in government spending could affect aggregate demand, Only if any change in the government deficit induced an equal concurrent change in private saving would government expenditure have no effect on demand. While an increase in the government debt would, according to the pre-Ricardian view, make households feel poorer and would therefore decrease their consumption, there is no reason why the entire change in wealth should be eliminated in a single year.
The explicit estimates presented below suggest that the magnitude of this form of ex ante crowding out is relatively small.
While the pre-Ricardian view puts too much emphasis on the future tax liabilities that are needed to service the existing debt, both the pre-Ricardian view and the conventional Keynesian analysis overlook a different link between current fiscal policies and future tax liabilities. A rise in government spending in one year may cause the public to expect higher spending in future years and therefore higher taxes to finance that spending.
larly, a rise in current taxes may cause individuals to revise their expectations of future taxes in the same direction. Section 1 examines briefly the nature and significance of the process by which households respond to these "fiscal signals" by revising their expectations and adjusting their spending.
The way in which any fiscal action affects current consumer spending therefore depends on the resulting change in expectations about future government spending as well as on its effect on concurrent disposable income and anticipated debt-service obligations.
Moreover, the change in expectations and spending that results from any given fiscal action will differ from one time to anbther ma way that depends on the whole history of previous fiscal actions and on the recent and past legislative debates. It is therefore impossible to predict with accuracy how consumers' spending will respond to the fiscal change in a particular year. This uncertainty and variability of response has important implications for macroeconomic policy and for the econometric testing of the preRicardian proposition.
The lack of a stable and predictable response implies that it is not appropriate to use changes in taxes and government spending for year-to-year demand management. 
Fiscal Expectations and Consumer Spending
The effectiveness o fiscal policy depends crucially on the way in which the consumer links a current fiscal change to his future tax liabilities and how these anticipated liabilities affect his current behavior. The pre-Ricardian hypothesis focuses exclusively on the future taxes that will be required to service the debt that results from current fiscal action. The !fiscal expectations" approach that I will now describe emphasizes that a current rise in government spending or taxes is likely to imply a higher future level of spending and taxes quite apart from any debt service obligations. These two views have quite different implications about the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
This section begins by commenting briefly on why the preRicardian hypothesis is likely to be less important than its proponents argue. I then discuss the nature and implications of the fiscal expectations approach. The next section then states five testable implications of the fiscal impotence and pre-Ricardian views that will provide the basis for the empirical work of the current paper.
The pre-Ricardian hypothesis is based on the fact that a dollar of tax reduction creates an extra dollar of national debt that must eventually be repaid pr serviced by interest payments with the same present value. The tax "reduction" is thus really only a tax "postponement," Since there is no change in the present value of the tax liabilities, there should be no change in consumer spending. While this argument has been known for a long-time, it has baen rejected on the ground that much or all of the future tax The ingenious feature of the revived pre-Ricardian argument is the proposition that individuals will act as if they will live forever because they are linked to future generations through a chain of bequests. If a current taxpayer plans to leave a bequest to his children, a decrease in his own tax and corresponding increase in the tax on his children (with the same present value) will cause him to increase his bequest. Indeed, to return to the initial equilibrium, the tapayer must save the entire initial tax reduction. The substitution of debt for taxes therefore has no effect on current demand since the government's dissaving is just offset by the individual's increased saving. A similar argument applies even if repayment of the debt will be postponed for many generations. Even if the current taxpayer does not care about the 1There are several other objections to the asserted equivalence of debt and taxes; see Buiter and Tobin (1978) and Barro (1979) , I regard the liquidity effect of the tax cut and the difference between the government borrowing rate and private borrowing rates as the two most significant of these additional objections, I will not discuss any of these issues in the present paper in order to focus on the contrasting views of expected future taxes, well-being of his great grandchildren, he will act as if he does if each successive generation will plan to make a positive bequest to the next generation. The current taxpayer will save the entire tax reduction in order to keep the consumption level of all of his future heirs unchanged.
The degree of foresight and rationality required by this process clearly strains the credibility of the analysis. There are two additional and more fundamental reasons for rejecting the conclusion that intergenerational altruism implies fiscal neutrality.
First, it is wrong to assume that parents who are concerned about the utility of their children will necessarily wish to leave bequests. A parent who believes that, because of generally rising productivity and real incomes, his children will be richer than himself, may well decide that the optimal "bequest" is negative, i.e., a transfer from his children to himself. Since this decision cannot be enforced, the constrained optimum for the parent is no bequest. This may remain the parent!s chosen position after a tax reduction and a corresponding increase in the national debt, It is clear that, for the vast majority of the population, there are no significant bequests to children Moreover, many o the observed bequests are unintended in the sense that the individuals had expected to consume more of their wealth and leave a smaller estate, Without the "interior solution" of positive intended bequests for the current generation and for all future generations, the "infinite life" character of current decision making is lost and the pre-Ricardian proposition is false.
Second, even if taxpayers respond to a tax reduction by an offsetting transfer to the next generation, the form of the transfer is very important. Barro and others recognize that their theory appears to be contradicted by the relative unimportance of bequests and note that there nevertheless are intergenerational transfers because parents make voluntary contributions to children in the form of educational investments and other expenses in the home. However, unlike saving for additional bequests, such in-kind transfers involve addition, spending. Thus even a perfectly offsetting intergenerational transfer is consistent with the conclusion that a tax reduction can increase current consumer spending.
When we drop the extreme assumption that individuals respond to fiscal changes as if they expect to live forever, it is clear that a one-time tax cut represents an increase in lifetime wealth.
A one-time tax cut taken in itself would therefore be expected to cause a small increase in consumption in the current year and in future years as well.1 A tax cut that is known to be permanent would of course imply a much larger increase in lifetime wealth and would therefore £nduce a much larger immediate increase in consumption.
More generally, households cannot classify tax changes as unambiguously temporary or permanent. Tax liabilities in future 1Binding liquidity constraints for any of the individuals whose taxes are reduced would increase the magnitude of the shortrun response. years must be regarded as unknown and current spending decisions must be made in the context of uncertainty about future taxes and pretax incomes, An important aspect of a tax change in any year and the associated legislative debate is that it causes households to revise their expectations about future tax liabilities.
The response of household consumption to any tax change can be formally regarded as a two-step process, First, each household revises its subjective probability distribution of all its future tax liabilities. Second, it sets the level of current consumption to maximize expected utility (over its whole lifetime, including the utility value of bequests) using the revised subjective probability distribution of future taxes and incomes.1 The response to a particular tax change in a year is therefore not a fixed constant "propensity to consume1' but an amount that varies with current conditions, previous fiscal policies, the legislative debate, etc.
The more that a given change in taxes is taken as a signal that future taxes will change in the same direction, the greater will be the consumers' initial response. The evidence presented in 1Note in particular that the entire subjective distribution matters and not just the vector of mean values. This has important implications for the Flaven -Hall -Sargent analysis of consumer behavior. In general, the specific past history of income and taxes will be relevant for updating the subjective distribution. When this is true, the change in consumption from one year to the next will depend not only on the current income and tax variables but also on the path of previous observations. This may explain why the evidence of Bilson and subsequent currently unpublished work by Hall and Misbkin does not support their original expectations. To the extent that consumers expect an increase in government am abstracting from the role of government spending as a substitute for or compliment to private spending. Depending on the particular type of public spending, it can substitute for current private consumption and stimulate saving (e.g., public tennis courts) or it can substitute for future private consumption and therefore reduce saving (e.g., public nursing homes). Compliments to current or future private consumption would have the opposite effect.
2There is of course the possibility of changes in consumer spending that result from changes in interest rates, real balances or portfolio composition. AsI noted in the £ntroduction, such "second run& effects are ignoredthroughout this paper in order to focus on ex ante crowding out.
spending to persist and to be financed by future taxes, they will associate a higher level of future taxes with a current increase in government spending. The tendency of government programs to continue indefinitely and the presumption against permanent budget deficits together imply that a current rise in government spending, even though it is not accompanied by a concurrent rise in taxes, will entail an equal permanent rise in taxes. This in itself implies a quite substantial fall in the taxpayers' real "wealth" and therefore a fall in current consumption. This reduction in the public's wealth is offset to the extent that the future government spending provides services of value. The effect on consumption of an increase in government spending depends on the resulting change in net wealth and on the specific role of government spending as a substitute or compliment to current and future consumption.
All of this implies that the response of consumers to current changes in government spending cannot be determined a priori on the basis of the effects of government deficits alone. Previous studies1 that assumed that increases in government spending and decreases in taxes would have the same effect on consumer spending therefore introduced an artificial constraj..nt Although econQmetric evidence cannot provide a precise measure of the effects of different types of spending changesthe evidence prescribed in section 3 indicates that government spending has on average had relatively little effect on 1For example, Kochin (1974) and Tanner (1979) . 13 private consumption. Changes in government spending therefore appear to raise or reduce aggregate demand nearly dollar for dollar.
In concluding this discussion of "fiscal expectations," it is useful to emphasize the complexity of the changes in expectations that can result from each fiscal action. In formal terms, individuals respond to a fiscal signal by changing their subjective probability distributions for all future taxes and expenditures.
It is not possible to represent these distributions by singlevalued "expected tax" and "expected government spending" variables.
Similarly, the conventional process of classifying tax changes as "temporary" or "permanent" is much too simple and arbitrary a representation of the complex change in expectations.
Five Testable Implications of Fiscal Impotence
The pre-.Ricardian equivalence hypothesis has four implications that can be tested directly with aggregate data on household consumption. The more extreme fiscal impotence proposition that even government spending does not add to aggregate demand entails a further testable implication within this framework. The present section discusses these five implications and describes the tests that will be reported in section 3.
Each of the five implications refers to the effect of some fiscal variable on consumer spending. The specific framework of the analysis is a consumption expenditure function relating real per capita consumer expenditures to a measure of real permanent income, to real wealth as conventionally defined, and to various fiscal variables:1
where C. is consumer expenditure in year t is 1Another obvious candidate for inclusions in the equation would be the real net rate of interest. Although it is clearly very difficult to construct a useful seri,es for this variable, Boskin's (1978) work indicates that progress on this is possible, My only excuse for not trying to include such a variable in the current study is the lack of an adequate series for the full sample period, national income,1 W is the market value of privately owned wealth at the beginning of year t,2 SSW. is a measure of the value of future social security benefits (that will be discussed later in this section), Gt is government spending on goods and services (including federal, state and local governments), Tt is tax revenues, TRt is government transfers to individuals, and Dt is the net debt of the federal, state and local governments. All variables are measured in constant 1972 dollars and are stated on a per capita basis.
The specification of equation 1 avoids the Keynesian restriction that consumer expenditure depends on disposable income and allows instead the more general possibility that the propensities to consume out of pretax income and out of tax reductions will not in general be equal. The discussion in the previous section of this paper made it clear that different consumption propensities are possible regardless of whether one accepts the more elaborate specification might divide national income into labor income and capital income or into personal income (net of transfers) and retained corporate profits. The division between labor and capital income poses problems for farm income, unincorporated businesses, etc, Previous studies suggest that the effective propensity to consume retained earnings may be quite close to the propensity to consume other types of income (see, e.g, Feldstein, 1973) . The single national income variable is not only the simplest specification but also, since it is closest in spirit to the pre-Ricardian view that the households cash receipts are not directly relevant to consumption, is the most suitable framework for testing the other implications of the pre-Ricardian hypothesis. The significance of retained earnings is tested directly in section 3. This wealth series is a slight improvement over the one that I have used in previous papers. For the period from 1953 through 1977, it is the beginning-of-year household net worth variable developed for the MIT-Penn-SSRC Model. (This variable, denoted VCN, was provided by Franco Modigliani.) For earlier years, the series is extrapolated backwards using the household wealth series that I used in previous studies and that is presented in Evans (1969) . The new wealth series is presented in the Appendix to the current paper.
pre-Ricardian view that debt and taxes are equivalent or the more general fiscal expectations view.
I should note at this point that although I think that equation 1 is a useful and desirable specification, I do not believe that it is a complete or accurate model of consumer behavior. It is important therefore to emphasize that I have adopted it as the framework for the tests presented in this paper because it is a direct generalization of the equations used by Barro, Kochin and Tanner to support their claims that the data favor the preRicardian hypothesis. More specifically, they relate consumer expenditure to the net government deficit rather than to the three fiscal variables, thus implicitly imposing the constraint that = = They also use ordinary least squares estimation, thus implicitly assuming that the fiscal variables are exogenous.
When these assumptions are dropped, the estimated parameters strongly contradict the pre-Ricardian hypothesis. Although the new estimates do not prove that the hypothesis is wrong, they do imply that the earlier estimates should be given no weight. The estimates to be presented in this paper leave no basis for asserting that the evidence favors the pre-Ricardian hypothesis of fiscal neutrality. As a minimum, the burden of proof now rests on those who support that view. A key prediction of the pre-Ricardian hypothesis is that a change in taxes has no effect when the levels of government spending and transfers are held constant. According to this view, since an increase in taxes also lowers the size of the public debt, consumer spending remains unchanged; in terms of equation 1, = 0. This stands in sharp contrast to the more general fiscal expectations view that a tax increase depresses consumption to an extent that 1See footnote 1, page 12.
varies with the impact of the particular tax change on expected future taxes. This implies that, although is not a constant, the estimated value of will be negative.
The pre-Ricardian line of reasoning also suggests that an increase in transfer payments financed by a government deficit should have no effect on current consumption. The current transfer payment is analogous to a reduction in taxes. While households currently have more spendable income, they also have a new future tax liability. The pre-Ricardian equivalence view implies that these two effects should just balance to leave current consumption unchanged:1 6 = o• More generally, however, there are several reasons for expecting transfers to be a powerful fiscal stimulus.
First, temporary transfers (e.g., unemployment insurance) and some permanent transfers (e.g., welfare payments and disability payments) are frequently given to individuals with binding liquidity constraints. Second, an increase in veterans benefits, social security or other permanent transfers is likely to be regarded by the recipients as a permanent increase in income. Third, an increase in the level of transfer payments will induce some individuals who are not currently eligible for benefits but who 1Although it m9ht be argued that transfer recipients are likely to have a higher marginal propensity to consume cash receipts than taxpayers in general, such an ar9ument would be quite contrary to the character of the analysis supporting the pre-Ricardian equivalence hypothesis which implies that current consumption should not depend on current cash f1w and that a redistribution of tax obligations among families should have no effect.
anticipate receiving benefits in the future to regard themselves as richer and therefore to increase their current consumption; this applies to all types of social insurance benefits that have replaced private saving "for a rainy day." All of this suggests that 6 is positive and may be quite substantial.
I have argued elsewhere that the anticipation of social security retirement benefits causes individuals to reduce their own saving for retirement and therefore, ceteris paribus, to increase their consumption (Feldstein, 1974) , To measure this effect, I
have used a variable that I have called "social security wealth"
and that I have constructed as the actuarial present value of the social security benefits for which the existing workforce and their dependents would become eligible when they reach age 65.1
These previous studies with a more conventional specification of the consumption function imply that is positive and of the same order of magnitude as the coefficient of the conventional wealth variable (2).2 In contrast to this view, Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1978 has 1See Feldstein (1974) for a description of the construction of this variable. Although a more refined calculation has since been developed for use with microeconomic data (see Feldstein and Pellechio, 1979) , the original method is still used to calculate the aggregate social security wealth values through 1974. Values for 1975-77 were obtained by extrapolating the 1974 ratio of SSW to GNP; although I plan to update the SSW series with the proper calculations,. that calculation could not be completed in time for this study. Limiting the analysis to the years ending in 1974 leaves the results of the study essentially unchanged. The SSW series is presented in the appendix to this paper.
2For the most recent of these time series studies, see Feldstein (l979a) . Microeconometric evidence in support of this conclusion is reviewed in Feldstein (1979b) . The final test is provided by including the value of the government debt itself. The pre-Ricardian equivalence view emphasizes that the public debt does not represent net wealth at all while the alternative "finite life" view is that the anticipation of future debt service obligations only partially offsets the value of the debt. Since the overall wealth variable (Wt) includes the value of the public debt, the pre-Ricardian hypothesis implies that a separate debt variable should have a coefficient that is negative but equal in magnitude to the coefficient of the total wealth variable; i.e., -. 2' The alternative view is that households treat public debt as a net contribution to wealth so 10r households are so irrational that they ignore future social security benefits when deciding their current saving. 1These comments do suggest important ways in which anticipated inflation may affect consumption and saving. These deserve further analysis if we are to understand the full impact of inflation on the economy. Although the bias cannot be fully eliminated, it can be reduced by instrumental variable estimation. The coefficient of the tax variable (5) obtained in this way is substantially larger than the more seriously biased ordinary least squares estimate. Other estimated specifications described below also indicate the importance of the bias in the previous estimates of the effect of 1The importance of the positive correlation between taxes and consumer expenditure is indicated by a regression of real per capita tax receipts on real per capita national income and real per capita consumption. The coefficient of the consumption variable is 0.70 (with.. a standard error of 0.09) while the coefficient of the income variable is only 0.06 (whth astandard error of 0.06). The estimate refers to the same sample period as the other equations reported in this section.
2lncluding Buiter and Tobin (1978) , Kochin (1974) and Tanner (1979) tax changes)
Before turning to the instruinental variable estimates, t is useful to look briefly at the ordinary least squares estimates presented in equation 1.1 of Table 1 be rejected at approximately the 10 percent level. The coefficient 1Other instrumental variables might achieve a greater reduction in bias but they are also likely to increase the mean square error of the estimate because they are less strongly correlated with the systematic components of the tax variable. However, adding the variable G -l to the instrument set left the coefficients essentially unchanged. is now twice its standard error. The coefficient of the social security wealth variable (.024) is almost identical to the coefficient of the ordinary wealth variable and is also twice its standard error.3 These coefficients imply that each of the implications 1This can be seen also by the alternative procedure of defining wealth to exclude the government debt. The coefficient of this net private wealth variable is 0.025 (with a standard error of 0.009) while the coefficient of the government debt variable is actually larger, 0.035 with a standard error of 0.30. A similar result was also obtained in the simpler specification of Yawitz and Meyer (1976) 2Recall that government debt is part of real wealth and therefore remains in the equation in that form. of the pre-Ricardian view can be rejected at conventional levels of significance; it is obviously very much more significant that all four tests should point simultaneously to rejection of the debt equivalence view.
In an earlier study of the effect of social security wealth (Feldstein, 1974) , I found that adding the unemployment rate as an additional variable to adjust for cyclical fluctuations in permanent income had the effect of reducing the coefficient of the SSW variable to less than its standard error.
Ithough the unemployment variable was itself statistically insignificant, this finding caused some commentors to doubt the conclusion that the promise of social security benefits reduces saving. In subsequent research with the improved data that became available after the national income accounts were revised, I found that adding the unemployment variable no longer mattered and that the unemployment variable itself remained statistically insignificant (Feldstein, 1979a) . To test whether this remains true with the current specification and sample period, equation 1.4 has been estimated with the product of the unemployment rate and the level of national income) It is clear that the coefficient of the unemployment variable is less than jts standard error and that the other coefficients remain essentially unchanged2 1This specification, which was adopted in earlier studies (Barro, 19787 Feldsten, 1978) , allows the impact of changes in the unemployment rate to vary with per capita income, 2i have also examined the effect of including this unemployment variable in combination with the debt variable. Neither of them is then significant. 
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that changes in government spending can have substantial effects on aggregate demand. Although monetary feedbacks may limit the net effect on output of any fiscal stimulus, there is no indication of ex ante crowding out through consumers' reactions to government debt.
Indeed, each of the basic implications of the pre-Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is contradicted by the data.
As I noted earlier in the paper, the analysis here has used the same basic specification as Barro, Kochin and Tanner but has dropped some of the restrictions that they had imposed. Rejecting their conclusion in this extension of their own framework implies that their parameter estimates can no longer be used to argue that the data support the pre-Ricardian hypothesis.
The results are instead consistent with a more general view of the effects of fiscal actions and fiscal expectations that is developed in the paper. A key feature of this view is that consumers interpret current changes in tax rates or in government spending as signals of possible future changes. More formally, they respond to any fiscal change by altering their subjective probability distributions of the taxes that they will pay and the benefits that they will receive for the rest of their lives. The distinction between "temporary" and "permanent" tax changes is an extreme and oversimplified version of this more general "fiscal expectations" view. The response to a fiscal change therefore cannot in general be calculated by classifying it as temporary or be with a different fiscal rule. In this sense, fiscal rules affect aggregate demand. The parameter estimates based on the very different regime of discretionary fiscal policy in which we actually live do not provide a complete basis for testing how the economy would behave under a regime of strict fiscal rules.
It is clear however that none of the estimated parameters are inconsistent with the effectiveness of fiscal rules. In particular, the significant coefficient of social security wealth and the similarity of the effects of government debt and other wealth both support the potential effectiveness of fiscal policy.
The fact that fiscal policies are potentially powerful does not mean that they are useful tools for short-term demand management.
The important and complex role of fiscal expectations that I have emphasized in this paper implies that the estimated coefficients indicate only the average responses for the 42 year sample period.
The reaction to any particular fiscal change may differ substantially from these averages, depending on the fiscal expectations created by the circumstances of the change. The overall economic response to any fiscal policy is further comp1icated by its monetary and portfolio consequences.
We therefore do not have, and may never be able to have, enough precise information to be confident that discretionary fiscal policies can reduce the average amplitude of the short-run business cycle. This implies that the appropriate role of fiscal policy is much more modest than the task that it has been assigned in recent years. The extent of our ignorance and the potentially 35 powerful effects of fiscal changes imply that the magnitude of discretionary fiscal changes should be very limited. More substantial changes in fiscal policies should in general be limited to situations in which a sustained change in aggregate demand is sought and precise timing is unimportant.
